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Culture of Impunity in the
Antiquities Market
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For decades, parties to conflicts have used the
cover of war to destroy and loot cultural property and
antiquities for financial gain and symbolic victory. The
“blood antiquities” excavated in conflict areas and sold
mostly in western markets fuel not only continued
conflict, but also (as in cases such as Syria and Iraq)
terrorism that can reach around the world. The culture
of impunity for both buyers and sellers of antiquities
allows the blood-antiquities trade to thrive.
A robust international legal framework does exist
to ensure accountability for the destruction of cultural
heritage. Because looting is a major cause of
destruction, it should be included in this framework. The
successful prosecution of Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi by
the International Criminal Court (ICC) on charges of
deliberately attacking historical and cultural
monuments bodes well for an end to impunity. Yet, this
paper argues that international and domestic systems of
regulation and certification are also needed to establish
criminal liability and eliminate the willful ignorance of
buyers.
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I. Introduction
On August 22, Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi pled guilty at the
International Criminal Court (ICC) on charges of deliberately attacking
historical and cultural monuments—the first ever prosecution for the
destruction of cultural heritage in front of the ICC.1 In the summer of
2012, Al Mahdi led a task force of Ansar Dine jihadists to destroy
historic tombs in Timbuktu, Mali, which had attracted African and
Middle Eastern Muslim pilgrims for centuries.2 The Muslim extremists
occupied Timbuktu for nearly a year before French forces finally ousted
them.3 The case against Al Mahdi provides some hope that more
perpetrators will be brought to justice for destroying cultural property
and antiquities, including the members of ISIS who have left a trail of
ruin across Iraq and Syria. ISIS, however, not only destroys cultural
sites, but also loots them and exploits the antiquities trade to raise
substantial funds to sponsor its operations.4 The lack of accountability
for looting and purchasing illegal antiquities allows terrorism and
conflict to flourish in the Middle East.
II. Blood Antiquities
Just as “blood diamonds” helped to fund devastating conflict in
Western, Central, and Southern Africa, “blood antiquities” are
1. Melik Kaylan, A Landmark Precedent to Protect Cultural Heritage, WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 30, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-landmark-
precedent-to-protect-cultural-heritage-1472590560
[https://perma.cc/RE9B-APNS].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Pamela Engel, ISIS’s looting of the Middle East is ‘the largest-scale mass
destruction of cultural heritage since’ WWII, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 12, 2016,
2:10 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-antiquities-destroyed-
smuggling-2016-1[https://perma.cc/3KUC-D7WT].
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financing terrorism and conflict in the Middle East.5 Although ISIS
claims to destroy some sites purely out of religious zeal, attempting to
erase all signs of what they call idolatry,6 ISIS and the Syrian regime
have both been accused of looting cultural heritage sites like Palmyra
for profit.7 Although the precise profits that ISIS generates from looting
are difficult to calculate, estimates range from $200 million to $8
billion.8 The Wall Street Journal emphasized the importance of this
income stream when it reported that looted antiquities are ISIS’s
second-largest source of financing after oil.9
Syrians on the ground report that ISIS issues licenses to loot in
exchange for a 20–50 percent tax on the proceeds.10 Indeed, a U.S.-led
raid on the compound of ISIS’s oil-smuggling and antiquities-trade
commander provided evidence of this practice.11 The commander
possessed an assortment of artifacts and receipts showing a 20-percent
tax on precious materials, including antiquities and minerals collected
from civilians.12
5. Mark V. Vlasic, Islamic State Sells ‘Blood Antiquities’ from Iraq and
Syria to Raise Money, WASH. POST (Sept. 14, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/islamic-state-sells-blood-
antiquities-from-iraq-and-syria-to-raise-money/2014/09/14/49663c98-
3a7e-11e4-9c9f-ebb47272e40e_story.html?utm_term=.dba16931c5ed
[https://perma.cc/SQE7-7KKQ].
6. Eric Gibson, The Destruction of Cultural Heritage Should be a War
Crime, WALL ST. J. (March 2, 2015, 12:38 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-destruction-of-cultural-heritage-
should-be-a-war-crime-1425073230 [https://perma.cc/BTY3-2BX6];
Kareem Shaheen, Isis Fighters Destroy Ancient Artefacts at Mosul
Museum, GUARDIAN (Feb. 26, 2015 4:26 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/26/isis-fighters-destroy-
ancient- artefacts-mosul- museum-iraq [https://perma.cc/E6P4-J2Z8].
7. Syrian Troops Looting Ancient City Palmyra, Says Archaeologist,
GUARDIAN (June 1, 2016, 3:17 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/01/syrian-troops-looting-
ancient-city-palmyra-says-archaeologist [https://perma.cc/NY5A-TB2J].
8. Georgina Adams, Antiquities: The Spoils of War, FIN. TIMES (March 11,
2016), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/950b8740-e1f6-11e5-9217-
6ae3733a2cd1.html#axzz4JnFjtNbK [https://perma.cc/V2QG-AXY8].
9. Mark V. Vlasic & Helga Turku, Countering IS’s Theft and Destruction of
Mesopotamia, WORLD POL’Y BLOG (July 7, 2015, 8:55 AM),
http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2015/07/07/countering-is’s-theft-and-
destruction-mesopotamia [https://perma.cc/6BDE-NLYV].
10. Id.
11. Celestine Bohlen, Escalating the War on Looting, N.Y. TIMES (March 11,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com
/2016/03/12/arts/international/escalating-the-war-on-
looting.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/W9FL-EHCU].
12. Id.
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Evidence suggests that thieves are storing many looted antiquities
in warehouses for a cooling-off period, after which they will be more
difficult to trace.13 In March 2015, a police raid in Bulgaria uncovered
a stash of items thought to be from the Sumerian city of Lagash, in
Southern Iraq.14
According to experts, traffickers and middlemen use a vast network
of smuggling channels, many through Lebanon or Turkey, to move the
antiquities from their country of origin to international markets.15 Once
antiquities leave their country of origin, it is often difficult to prove
that they were looted from a conflict area rather than transferred
through legitimate channels.16 Smugglers’ frequent use of forged
documents exacerbates the problem further.17 According to news
reports, the lack of concrete evidence of illegal excavation often compels
authorities to avoid pursuing criminal charges against smugglers in
return for reclaiming the stolen objects, thereby allowing the
perpetrators to escape liability.18
Reports indicate that many looted antiquities end up with buyers
in Western markets and the Gulf.19 According to Lynda Albertson,
CEO of the Association for Research into Crimes against Art in Rome,
lawmakers have not paid enough attention to preventing buyers in
wealthy markets from purchasing looted antiquities.20
Today, front-page news often features ISIS and the Middle East,
but antiquities trafficking is hardly novel, having funded terrorism for
decades. For example, in 1999, one of the hijackers from the 9/11
attacks sold ceramics in Germany, which were stolen from Afghanistan,
allegedly with the intent of purchasing an airplane.21 In addition, during
13. Bill Briggs, How Terrorists Tap a Black Market Fueled by Stolen
Antiquities, NBC NEWS (June 23, 2014),
http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/iraq-turmoil/how-terrorists-tap-
black-market-fueled-stolen-antiquities-n137016 [https://perma.cc/X9ZT-
ZQVV].
14. Bohlen, supra note 11.
15. Joe Parkinson & Duncan Mavin, West Seeks Tighter Curbs on Trade in
Antiquities Looted by Islamic State, WALL ST. J. (March 30, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/west-seeks-tighter-curbs-on-trade-in-
looted-antiquities-1427761561 [https://perma.cc/C4GP-DH8W].
16. Id.
17. Briggs, supra note 13.
18. Bohlen, supra note 11.
19. Parkinson & Mavin, supra note 15.
20. Parkinson & Mavin, supra note 15.
21. Heather Pringle, New Evidence Ties Illegal Antiquities Trade to
Terrorism, Violent Crime, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (June 13, 2014),
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/06/140613-looting-
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the Cambodian Civil War in 1970, the Vietnam People’s Army and the
Khmer Republic instituted industrial looting.22 Similarly, after the
Russian Civil War and the famine-induced peasant uprisings in 1922,
the Soviet regime looted property from the Russian Orthodox Church,
Armenian Orthodox Church, Greek Orthodox Church, and Anglican
Church of Moscow, as well as Jewish synagogues.23 That year,
thousands of stolen antiquities were sold to foreign collectors, which
raised billions of dollars, primarily for arms purchases from Germany.24
While terrorists gain financially from looting, the people who view
these artifacts as part of their cultural heritage experience an emotional
and financial cost from the theft. Ancient sites and monuments often
represent not only symbols of national unity and pride,25 but also
important religious or cultural heritage. Cultural heritage is a valuable
part of individual and group identity,26 which is one reason why
terrorists choose to target it.27 Destruction of cultural sites can lead to
anger, division, and retaliation that fuel further conflict.28 In addition,
countries often gain significant revenue from tourism at cultural
heritage sites, which is greatly reduced during conflict or instability.29
The ancient site of Palmyra, for example, received 150,000 tourists a
antiquities-archaeology-cambodia-trafficking-culture/
[https://perma.cc/LHM5-J7QL].
22. SAMUEL ANDREW HARDY, THE CONFLICT ANTIQUITIES TRADE: A
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW, 27 (2015).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Amr Al-Azm,Why ISIS Wants to Destroy Syria’s Cultural Heritage, TIME
(Oct. 8, 2015), http://time.com/4065290/syria-cultural-heritage/
[https://perma.cc/3KDU-JHKX].
26. Stephen Stenning. Destroying Cultural Heritage: More Than Just
Material Damage, BRIT. COUNCIL (Aug. 21, 2015, 10:14 AM),
https://www.britishcouncil.org/voices-magazine/destroying-cultural-
heritage-more-just-material-damage [https://perma.cc/JTF5-SDPS].
27. Dana Ballout, U.N. Condemns Destruction of Ancient Palmyra Temple,
WALL ST. J. (Sep. 1, 2015, 9:26 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/ancient-palmyra-temple-completely-
destroyed-u-n-says-1441116972 [https://perma.cc/4QW6-H37Q].
28. David W. Bowker, Laura Goodall & Rebecca A. Haciski, Confronting
ISIS’s War on Cultural Property, 20 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS 12 (July
14, 2016),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/20/issue/12/confronting-isis-war-
cultural-property [https://perma.cc/4W6A-W5QM].
29. Deborah Lehr, Digging out of Tourism Downfalls: Egypt’s Archaeology
Takes the Stage, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 16, 2015, 12:50 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/deborah-lehr/digging-out-of-tourism-
do_b_6341104.html [https://perma.cc/T3RN-M5XP].
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year before Syria’s civil war began.30 This income stream cannot be
recovered if ISIS completes its destruction of the site.
It seems surprising that ISIS, a terrorist organization that the U.N.
has condemned for destroying cultural sites,31 has managed to infiltrate
the international antiquities market and sell antiquities to high-end
collectors without consequence. Unfortunately, the culture of impunity
for purchasers and the weak regulatory system make this scenario
possible.
III. Culture of Impunity
There is technically nothing illegal about owning and purchasing
antiquities; the legality of the trade revolves around how the antiquities
have been acquired.32 Many antiquities are considered legal even though
their provenance is ambiguous because they have been in circulation so
long.33 For example, the antiquities removed during periods of colonial
rule were made legal simply through the passage of time.34
Surprisingly, laws facilitate the transformation of illicit antiquities
to licit ones.35 The majority of antiquities on the market are sold with
no provenance documentation, which is a strong indication that they
were looted from archaeological sites, museums, churches, or private
collections.36 Legal conceptualizations of property and ownership,
however, can turn these illicit antiquities into legal ones through
protections for good faith purchasers.37 Many civil-law countries
maintain that if someone purchases an antiquity in good faith, the
purchaser has good title and the object is no longer considered a stolen
good.38 Other legal doctrines that facilitate the process of creating good
title are statutes of limitations, allocation of the burden of proof, and
adverse possession.39
30. Palmyra’s Temple of Bel Destroyed, Says U.N., BBC (Sep. 1, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34111092
[https://perma.cc/AYN8-ZPCP].
31. Ballout, supra note 27.
32. Blythe A. Bowman, Transnational Crimes Against Culture, 24 J.
CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 3, 227 (Aug. 2008).
33. Id. at 227–28.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 233 (defining “good faith purchaser” as someone who purchases
antiquities with no knowledge that they were illegally looted).
38. Id.
39. Id.
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While some purchases of illegal antiquities are honest mistakes,
others result from willful ignorance.40 For instance, in 2002, Sotheby’s
auction house sold $3 million worth of Egyptian antiquities.41 By 2010,
the amount of looting in Egypt doubled as a result of the global
recession, while at the same time Sotheby’s sales figures for Egyptian
antiquities rose to $13 million for the year.42 Given the strong likelihood
that Egyptian antiquities entering the market during this period were
illicitly acquired, “good faith” purchases of these items seem almost
impossible.43
The culture of impunity contributes to the intrinsically linked
challenges of preventing the illegal trafficking and sale of blood
antiquities and establishing accountability for looters and buyers.
IV. International Legal Frameworks to Protect
Cultural Heritage
Although only a very weak regulatory system exists to prosecute
the looting and purchase of conflict antiquities, there is a strong
international legal framework that has succeeded in holding individuals
accountable for the destruction of cultural heritage. Because looting, as
demonstrated by ISIS, necessarily involves the destruction of cultural
sites, it belongs within this legal framework.
The first pillar in the framework is the 1954 Hague Convention for
the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,
which was adopted as a result of the severe cultural destruction that
occurred during World War II. The Convention covers immovable and
moveable cultural heritage, including monuments, art, archaeological
sites, scientific collections, manuscripts, books, and other objects of
artistic, historical, or archaeological interest.44 The Convention
prohibits parties to an armed conflict from exercising “direct hostilities
40. Sarah Parcak, Lust for Loot: Collecting Is Driving the Demand for
Plunder, NAT’L Geographic: EXPLORERS J. (May 19, 2016),
http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2016/05/19/lust-for-loot-
collecting-antiquities-looting-egypt/ [https://perma.cc/P9U4-88GW].
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Sarah Parcak, David Gathings, Chase Childs, Greg Mumford & Eric
Cline, Satellite Evidence of Archaeological Site Looting in Egypt: 2002–
2013, 90 ANTIQUITY 349, 188, 189 (2016) (noting that two-thirds of
Egyptian antiquities sold at Sotheby’s in the last decade lack provenance
prior to 1973).
44. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict art. 1, Mar. 13, 2009, 249 U.N.T.S. 240.
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against cultural property,” and requires them to “avoid incidental
damage to such property.”45
The second pillar is the 1977 Protocol II amendment to the Geneva
Conventions, which applies to non-international armed conflicts. The
Protocol prohibits “any acts of hostility directed against historic
monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the
cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples, and [using] them in support of
the military effort.”46 By including protections for cultural objects, the
Protocol highlights the importance of safeguarding humankind’s
heritage.47
The third pillar is the Rome Statute of the ICC, which designates
as a war crime the intentional attack against “buildings dedicated to
religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic
monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are
collected, provided they are not military objectives.”48 The
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), for
instance, applied the Rome Statute when it convicted Pavle Strugar49
and Jadranko Prlić50 of destroying cultural property along with other
war crimes, such as murder and civilian attacks.
Recently, the ICC conducted its first war-crimes trial based solely
on the charge of cultural-monument destruction. Ahmad Al Faqi Al
Mahdi, a member of the Islamist extremist group Ansar Dine, was
accused of, and plead guilty to,51 destroying the Sidi Yahia Mosque and
nine mausoleums in Timbuktu, Mali.52 The proceedings against Al
45. Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, INT’L
COMM. RED CROSS (Oct. 29, 2010), https://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-
law/conduct-hostilities/cultural-property/overview-cultural-
property.htm [https://perma.cc/U6NN-LDVE].
46. Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 art.
16, available at
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0321.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SUP2-GFDB].
47. See id.
48. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8, signed but not
ratified Dec. 31, 2000, 37 I.LM. 999.
49. Judgement in the Case the Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar: Pavle Strugar
Sentenced to Eight Years’ Imprisonment, INT’L. CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (Jan. 31, 2005),
http://www.icty.org/en/press/judgement-case-prosecutor-v-pavle-
strugar-pavle-strugar-sentenced-eight-years%E2%80%99-imprisonment
1/ [https://perma.cc/2TPG-ERL5].
50. Prosecutor v. Prlić, Case No. IT-04-74-T, Judgement Summary, ¶ 4 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 29, 2013).
51. Kaylan, supra note 1.
52. Malian Jihadi to Plead Guilty in ICC Cultural Destruction Trial,
GUARDIAN (May 24, 2016, 8:15 AM),
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Mahdi are pivotal because a war-crimes conviction would not only
demonstrate the serious nature of cultural-property destruction, but
also encourage compliance with the laws protecting cultural heritage.53
The fourth pillar consists of post-conflict peace agreements that
intentionally address the issue of cultural destruction. Annex 8 of the
Dayton Accords, which ended the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, is
formally titled the Agreement on Commission to Preserve National
Monuments. 54 Annex 8 guarantees the citizens of Bosnia and
Herzegovina the right to protect, reconstruct, and rehabilitate cultural
property.55 After the Yugoslav Wars, the national government of Bosnia
and Herzegovina adopted legislation that implemented Annex 8 and
facilitated cultural monument reconstruction, such as by easing the
process for obtaining construction permits.56 Rebuilding was a necessary
part of the process allowing citizens to regain their dignity and
identity.57
The fifth pillar is the UNESCO Convention on the Means of
Prohibiting the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of
Cultural Property (UNESCO Convention), which provides the right to
repatriate stolen or illegally exported antiquities from other member
countries. The convention, however, limits recovery to “property stolen
from a museum or a religious or secular public monument or similar
institutions provided that such property is documented as appertaining
to the inventory of that institution.”58 Importantly, the UNESCO
Convention does not explicitly cover unprovenanced antiquities.
Although this international framework, in particular the ICC
conviction of Al Mahdi, provides some hope that future prosecutions
against ISIS members for cultural-heritage destruction will ensue, it
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2016/may/24/malian-jihadi-to-
plead-guilty-forgiveness-icc-cultural-destruction-trial
[https://perma.cc/3N7N-FKRQ].
53. Marina Lostal, ICC Opens a Case for the Destruction of Cultural Heritage
in Mali, GLOBAL POL’Y FORUM (Oct. 2, 2015),
https://www.globalpolicy.org/home/163-general/52814-icc-opens-a-case-
for-the-destruction-of-cultural-heritage-in-mali.html
[https://perma.cc/C35F-QNU2].
54. Valery Perry, Reversing Ethnic and Cultural Cleansing: The Role of
Annex 8 in Reclaiming History, Promoting Post-War Reconciliation and
Preserving the Unique Cultural Heritage of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2
EUR. Y.B. MINORITY ISSUES 197, 198 (2002/3).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 211–14.
57. Id. at 223–24.
58. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property art. 7, Sept. 2,
1983, 10 I.L.M. 289.
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does nothing to caution smugglers and buyers of illegal antiquities.
Given that the purchase of blood antiquities plays a large role in
financing conflict and terror, it is a mistake for international law to
focus only on the supply side.
V. Reliance on Domestic Legal Frameworks
Absent an international legal framework for criminal liability, the
only currently available means to hold individuals accountable for trade
in looted antiquities is through the domestic courts.
In the U.S., relevant national legislation includes the Convention
on Cultural Property Implementation Act of 1983 (CCPIA), which gave
effect to sections of the UNESCO Convention and the National Stolen
Property Act (NSPA).59 The NSPA criminalizes the transportation,
sale, and receipt of illegally obtained goods by individuals with
knowledge of the goods’ illegal status.60 Although defendants have been
successfully prosecuted under this law,61 prosecutors face difficulties in
demonstrating both the “illegally-obtained” and “with knowledge”
elements of the crime.
With respect to the first element, it is difficult to prove that
antiquities are stolen, especially unprovenanced antiquities. Under U.S.
law, the proof requires two steps: (1) there must be a foreign-nation
vesting statute, often called a patrimony law, which establishes
ownership by the state; and (2) there must be evidence of illegal export
which constitutes the theft.62 Because of the often-ambiguous
circumstances surrounding the excavation and ownership history of a
cultural antiquity, however, evidence gathering can be a significant
barrier to prosecution.63
With regard to the second element, proving that a defendant knew
an object was illegally excavated is challenging “[o]nce antiquities are
removed from their context.”64 Many cultural objects were excavated
hundreds of years ago and have been traded with little or no
59. Stephen K. Urice, Between Rocks and Hard Places: Unprovenanced
Antiquities and the National Stolen Property Act, 40 N.M. L. REV. 123,
126–27 (2010).
60. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2314 (2013).
61. Id.
62. Urice, supra note 59, at 130.
63. Summary of Law: National Stolen Property Act, NAT’L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. OFFICE FOR COASTAL MGMT (last visited Oct. 16,
2016), https://coast.noaa.gov/data/Documents/
OceanLawSearch/Summary%20of%20Law%20-
%20National%20Stolen%20Property%20Act.pdf?redirect=301ocm
[https://perma.cc/V57Y-DG7W].
64. Id.
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recordkeeping, making it difficult for collectors to know the legality and
provenance of the items for sale.65 The legal protections for “good faith”
buyers and the culture of willful ignorance adds further complication.
VI. Ending Impunity
Some governments are taking steps to strengthen domestic systems
of accountability. American, British, and German authorities are
creating legislation to make it easier to prosecute defendants accused of
antiquities theft. Western intelligence agencies have also formed a task
force to monitor trade in antiquities.66 Furthermore, UNESCO is using
$3.5 million in E.U. funds to train customs officials to detect antiquities
before they reach buyers.67
New legislation to combat the looted-antiquities trade centers on
using stronger import controls to prevent the artifacts from reaching
buyers.68 This approach resembles the efforts to combat conflict
diamonds, which focused on certifying stones not mined in conflict
zones before they reach legal markets. This certification procedure
resulted from what is known as the Kimberly Process,69 which began
when Southern African diamond-producing states met to discuss ways
to prevent the diamond trade from financing violence in the region.70
In 2000, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a
resolution supporting an international certification plan for conflict-free
diamonds.71 Resulting from negotiations between governments, non-
governmental organizations, and diamond-industry members, the
Kimberley certification scheme has been adopted by 81 countries and
covers 99.8 percent of the global diamond production.72 While this
system is not without critics, it illustrates the capacity of the
international community to regulate trade in conflict-related goods.73
65. Id.
66. Parkinson & Mavin, supra note 15.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Kimberley Diamonds Process Certification, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER
PROTECTION (Aug. 5, 2016), https://www.cbp.gov/trade/programs-
administration/kimberley-diamonds-process-certification
[https://perma.cc/3WAH-L4JD].
70. About: KP Basics, KIMBERLEY PROCESS (last visited Oct. 16, 2016),
https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/about [https://perma.cc/L665-
L36P].
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See David Rhode, The Kimberley Process is a ‘Perfect Cover Story’ for
Blood Diamonds, GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2014, 10:40 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com /sustainable-business/diamonds-blood-
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The discrepancy between global efforts to prevent the sale of “blood
diamonds” and “blood antiquities” highlights the relative weakness of
the regulatory oversight of the trade in antiquities.
However, even a regulatory system that could adequately certify
that antiquities are “conflict free” would fail to hold the demand side
of the trade accountable for its role in illicit looting and dealing. The
regulations would not address the culture of impunity that accompanies
the willful ignorance of collectors.
One proposed solution would be the creation of a global registry of
legitimate antiquities through collaboration between the collecting and
scholarly communities.74 Then, international and national legal regimes
could be created to criminalize the sale or purchase of any antiquity
not on the registry.75 Countries could also develop a system for
certifying legitimate antiquities dealers and making purchases from
non-certified dealers illegal. Additionally, buyers purchasing antiquities
known to be from areas where terror groups operate could be prosecuted
for financing terrorism.76
Without a system of accountability, terrorist groups such as ISIS
will continue to profit from looting and use their financial gains to take
more lives in the Middle East and the West. It is therefore of the utmost
importance to establish regulations and legislation as suggested above
to interrupt both the demand and supply sides in the market for blood
antiquities.
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